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The origins of the Asian Cold War: Malaya 1948
Karl Hack
From the 1970s most scholars have rejected the Cold War orthodoxy that the Malayan
Emergency (1948–60) was a result of instructions from Moscow, translated into action
by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). They have instead argued that local factors
precipitated violence, and that the MCP was relatively unprepared when the
Emergency was declared. This article puts the international element back into the
picture. It shows that the change from a ‘united front’ to a ‘two camp’ international
communist line from 1947 played a significant role in deciding local debates in favour
of revolt. It also demonstrates how the MCP had plans for a graduated build-up to
armed revolt before an Emergency was declared. This article therefore offers a
model for a dynamic, two-way relationship between the international and local levels
of Cold War.
By early 1948 the high levels of violence that had stalked Malaya since the end of
the Pacific War appeared to be ebbing a little. In January and March 1948, murders in
Malaya reached a post-war low: seven in each month. Strikes were below their postwar
peak.1 The Malayan Security Service had little new to say about communist plans in
the first three months of 1948, for the simple reason that Malayan Communist Party
(MCP) strategy had changed little over the previous year.2 Up until early 1948, the
MCP Central Committee still supported a policy of open and legal political and
union activity, frequently in cooperation with bourgeois parties. The MCP Central
Committee meeting of 20–26 March 1948 was to change all this.
In April 1948 strikes proliferated, attended by increased violence, intimidation
and murder. Murder incidents had fallen from 1946 to 1947 (from a yearly 421 to
220) but in 1948, they shot up to 470, almost entirely due to a surge in and after
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2 See Oxford University, Rhodes House Library (henceforth RHL), MSS Indian Ocean s251, Malayan
Security Service (MSS) Political Intelligence Journal (PIJ), Supplements for Jan.–Mar.1948. MCP plans
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April.3 By May and early June, murders of Asian (Europeans were as yet rarely
targets) labour contractors, employers and MCP opponents had increased markedly.
Events came to a head in June. The MCP was increasing its labour action. On 1
June a police baton charge, aimed at evicting workers from their Johor estate, left
seven workers dead. The MCP ‘defence’ of workers intensified, culminating in the
events of 16 June.4 Until then, political murders had been growing, but still averaging
less than one a day. But on this one day three European estate managers and two
Asians were killed. Growing exasperation at the government’s inability to counter
the threat now exploded on to the front pages of the press. The next day, the
Straits Times thundered that High Commissioner Edward Gent should ‘Govern or
Get Out’. On the 18th, Gent declared a national state of emergency: one that would
officially last until July 1960, and involve up to 8,000 insurgents on one side, and
up to 40,000 troops, 70,000 police and 250,000 Home Guards on the other. In the
hours and days that followed the declaration of an emergency, more than 1,000
left-wing and union activists were detained without trial under Emergency
powers. But that did not save Gent’s career or, indirectly, his life. Recalled to
London for talks, he was killed when his aircraft crashed near London early in the
following month.
What is to be explained: The transition from united fronts to Asia-wide revolts
We need to explain this dramatic change in Malaya, which can be dated to
between February and June 1948. The suddenness of the change naturally leads to
questions about the role of MCP planning. Given the radical change in the MCP
stance over the course of early 1948, how did this occur and what role did it play
in the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency?
Yet MCP planning cannot be seen in isolation. The contrast between the local situ-
ation in late 1947 and late 1948 is astonishing for many Asian countries, not just for
Malaya. In mid-1947, left-wing parties in India, and across most of Southeast Asia,
were either in a state of uneasy truce with governments, or engaged in open, consti-
tutional politics. The priority was rebuilding after the war, ending shortages and win-
ning independence, which would come in a wave of decolonisation to India and
Pakistan (15 August 1947), Burma (4 January 1948) and Ceylon (4 February 1948).
In Indochina, the Viet Minh continued to control much of the north of the country,
briefly negotiating with the French, while in Indonesia the main contest was not ideo-
logical but rather between nationalist Indonesian Republicans on the one hand, and the
Dutch on the other. The Soviet Union itself still supported an international communist
line of pursuing ‘united front’ tactics with anti-colonial bourgeois parties.
Yet in 1948 such ‘united front’ tactics were abandoned in almost all these areas,
with armed communist uprisings occurring in that year in Malaya, Burma, the
3 Hack, Defence and decolonisation, p. 116, citing Annual Report of the Federation of Malaya, 1948
(KL), pp. 8 and 124–5. Historians often seem to assume violence and strikes were at a peak or increasing
in early 1948, whereas this most obvious of sources – the Annual Report – shows the surge in violence
was consequence not cause of the MCP’s March decisions. Despite the Emergency, some categories of
crime (housebreaking, theft) still fell in 1948 as a whole. The MCP’s problem was not rising violence
they had to tap, but declining postwar disorder.
4 Hack, Defence and decolonisation, p. 117.
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Philippines and Indonesia, and the Franco-Viet Minh partial truce breaking down.
Inevitably, this raises the additional question of whether 1948 saw the calculated
opening of an Asian front in the wider, international Cold War. Hence the second
major issue to be investigated is whether the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
instructed or influenced the opening of a new Cold War front in Asia, including in
Malaya, in 1948?
We now have two main questions. Firstly, did the MCP have a ‘plan’ for armed
insurrection by mid-1948? Secondly, did the Soviet Union prompt the dramatic
changes in many Asian communist parties policies between mid 1947 and late 1948?
The Cold War orthodoxy: International directives, MCP plan for revolt
In the late 1940s to early 1950s, a Cold War orthodoxy on these questions
emerged, which held (in public at least), that the Soviet Union did issue instructions,
that these were conveyed to Southeast Asian communist parties, and that these instruc-
tions caused the dramatic change in MCP policy and behaviour outlined above. The
‘instructions’ were said to have been first shaped at the inaugural meeting of the
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) of September 1947, and in Soviet the-
orist Andrei Zhdanov’s speech to it. This speech, later reproduced in the first edition of
Cominform’s journal, signalled the end of the period of ‘United Front’ political tactics,
by which communist parties worldwide had tried to enter parliaments and form alli-
ances with bourgeois parties. Zhdanov instead announced the arrival of an era of
two camps – the democratic led by the Soviet Union and the imperialist led by the
United States – with conflict between them increasingly inevitable. This gave impetus
to communist parties worldwide to move tomore combative positions, whether remov-
ing non-communists from coalitions (as in Prague in February 1948), or becoming
more aggressive in opposition. The suspicion that this new line was disseminated to
the Southeast Asian parties at the Calcutta conferences held in February 1948,5 thereby
sparking the proximate revolts across Southeast Asia, was a natural one.
After some initial confusion in British official circles in mid-1948,6 this was the
conclusion towards which British officials veered. In the words of a 1957 British mili-
tary summary of the Emergency: ‘In June 1948, on the instructions of the Cominform
issued at two conferences in Cacutta four months earlier, the MCP started a campaign
of murder, sabotage and terrorism designed to paralyse the Government and develop
into armed insurrection.’
In short, the Malayan Emergency was a local branch of the Asian Cold War,
which was in turn a Moscow-directed extension of the Western Cold War.7
5 These two conferences were the South East Asia Youth and Student Conference hosted by the World
Federation of Democratic Youth, a Moscow-inspired movement (19–24 Feb.), and the Second Congress
of the Indian Communist Party (28 Feb.–6 Mar.). Both were attended by representatives from a range of
Southeast Asian communist parties.
6 A.J. Stockwell, ‘A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in Malaya’, Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21, 3 (1993): 66–88, discusses the British debates over how far the
Emergency which commenced in 1948 was locally rooted, and how far internationally.
7 See, for example, the 1957 report on the Malayan Emergency issued under the name of the British
Director of Operations held in The National Archives (henceforth TNA): Air20=10377, ‘Review of
Emergency in Malaya June 1948 – August 1957’, including the quotation on p. 3; and for a secondary
source of the era, J.H. Brimmell, Communism in South East Asia; A political analysis (Oxford: Oxford
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The revisionist interpretation: No international directives, no plan
Recent scholarship is sceptical about this ‘Cold War orthodoxy’. The pre-eminent
expert on British colonial records for Malaya, Anthony Stockwell, argued strongly
against both propositions in a 1993 article. In 2006 he gave a succinct summary of
his position, writing in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society that:
Given that Malaya experienced endemic violence throughout the immediate post-war
years, it is difficult to pinpoint the start of the armed struggle. Working from suspect
intelligence the colonial authorities had no doubt that the Malayan communists planned
a rising and, in the febrile atmosphere of the Cold War, it was easy to jump to the con-
clusion that the Malayan disturbances were the culmination of a long-concocted plot
orchestrated by the Soviet Union. Historians, however, have long since abandoned the
view that the Malayan Communist Party mounted a revolution in obedience to instruc-
tions transmitted from Moscow via, first, a London conference of Commonwealth com-
munists in late 1947 and, then, the Calcutta Youth Conference of February 1948. Some
have argued that the MCP’s decisions were shaped primarily by Malayan circumstances;
others have suggested that the Party reacted to events, instead of determining them, and
thus stumbled into revolution.8
The ‘others’ referred to presumably include Tim Harper, who had argued that British
attempts to remove illegal rural squatters – most being communist supporters – from
the forest fringe produced a welling up of violence from below in 1947 to 1948.9 The
problem with this latter argument is that, as the opening to this article demonstrated,
violence was decreasing, not increasing immediately before the MCP’s March 1948
decisions. The subsequent increase in violence was at MCP behest, not merely a
despairing attempt by the leadership to harness forces from below.
Stockwell, meanwhile, does not quite pin down what did cause the change in
MCP tactics, but does unequivocally reject the notion that the party was simply
Moscow’s puppet. For convenience sake, we will dub this and other works which
reject the Cold War orthodoxy ‘revisionist’. As I have discussed elsewhere, most scho-
larly, specialist accounts from the 1970s follow this line.10
This mainstream, ‘revisionist’ academic historiography developed roughly as
follows. In 1958, Ruth McVey argued that what mattered was not the Calcutta
Conferences, but the gradual dissemination of the change in the international
University Press, 1959), pp. 255–63. This was the predominant line from the late 1940s to the 1950s at
least, though even then there were sceptics. For example, see below for a discussion of the doubts of scho-
lars such as Ruth McVey from the late 1950s.
8 Anthony Stockwell, ‘Chin Peng and the struggle for Malaya’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 6, 1
(2006): 279–97; Stockwell, ‘A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in Malaya’.
9 Tim Harper, The end of empire and the making of Malaya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), pp. 94–114. See also Hack, Defence and decolonisation, p. 153, fn. 42 for analysis of the claim.
Harper’s theory is plausible, but not borne out by government statistics for the period prior to the crucial
MCP decisions.
10 See Philip Deery, ‘Malaya, 1948: Britain’s Asian Cold War’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 9, 1 (2007):
29–54, and review of same by Karl Hack, last accessed on 31 Oct. 2008 at http:==www.h-net.
org=~diplo=reviews=PDF=Hack-Deery.pdf. The parent URL for both pieces is: http:==www.h-net.
org=~diplo=reviews=jcws=jcws2007.html.
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communist line from September 1947. For her, the Calcutta Conferences merely
added tinder to the fire.
Now, one way of interpreting McVey would be that people were looking for the
wrong ‘murder weapon’: for ‘instructions’, when the real weapon was an international
communist line. But that is not, unfortunately, how most subsequent scholars have
proceeded. Instead, working on the assumption that the international factor was
peripheral, they have stressed how internal processes drove events, and ultimately
caused the local revolts in general, and the Malayan Emergency specifically.
The tendency has been to cite increasingly varied local reasons, pictured as coa-
lescing to where revolt was all but inevitable by early 1948. As early as 1975, Anthony
Short’s classic work, The communist insurrection in Malaya, argued the issues were
complex and ambivalent. According to him they included, for instance: tightening
British labour legislation; and MCP reaction against the united front policy of its
former leader Lai Teck, who had absconded in March 1947. Lai Teck was exposed
as having betrayed his party to the Japanese during the occupation, and to the
British before and after the war. As his treachery was gradually unveiled to lower
and lower echelons of the party, the former ‘united front’ line he had championed
was poisoned by association. It was also failing of its own accord, since in 1947 to
1948 the British ignored protests which the MCP launched in coordination with
the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the embryonic Malayan Democratic Union
and other organisations. These protests campaigned against new citizenship laws
which restricted the number of Chinese granted citizenship, and against the new
Malayan Federation constitution which re-entrenched Malay Sultans as sovereign
in their states, and as guardians of Malay interests. These moves seemed to them
retrogressive, and to signify a British retreat to reliance on conservative Malay forces
represented by UMNO. Hence when the Malayan Federation was inaugurated on
1 February 1948 (to replace the Malayan Union of 1946–48), the MCP was very
frustrated indeed.11
It is not surprising, given the varied problems the imperial archive reveals the
MCP faced by early 1948, that academics increasingly concentrated on domestic
explanations. By the 1980s, authors such as Stubbs and Stockwell clearly favoured
complex, multicausal explanations, which blended MCP reaction to increasing
British labour controls, MCP leadership problems and, to a decreasing degree, inter-
national changes.12 Inevitably some military and non-specialist historians were slower
to come round, but they were outside of the mainstream of academic ‘revisionist’ lit-
erature. The latter is reflected in Stockwell’s seminal 1993 article, the substance of
which was very recently restated by Deery in his 2007 piece for the Journal of Cold
11 Short’s book (Anthony Short, The communist insurrection in Malaya, 1948–60 [London: Frederick
Muller, 1975]) was written some years earlier, but delayed when the Malayan government, who commis-
sioned it, declined to publish it. It was reissued as In pursuit of the mountain rats (Singapore: Cultured
Lotus, 2000). See pp. 46–9 for Calcutta sounding ‘an uncertain note’ with ‘a lot of hard matching’ to be
done locally.
12 Richard Stubbs, Hearts and minds in guerrilla warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 60. Even in 1989, Stubbs presented as novel his downgrad-
ing of the Calcutta factor, even though Short had already shifted the ground.
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War Studies.13 Stockwell’s 1993 article suggested rising MCP violence had diverse
causes, and that by mid-1948, it was not yet at the stage of fully planned rebellion.14
I have used this approach myself in the past, describing the Emergency’s origins
as multicausal, its outbreak as ‘over-determined’. That is, when the MCP took its
decisions to prepare the ground for ‘people’s revolutionary war’, during the March
and May 1948 Central Committee meetings, it was faced with the treachery of its
former Secretary General, a record low of post-war violence around February 1948,
a decline in strikes, government clearing of its squatter supporters from the jungle
fringe, looming trade union legislation, and a communist international line now
rejecting previous over-optimism. Hence, ‘the resort to violence was massively
over-determined’.15
In these circumstances it might appear that any few of the many factors might
have been sufficient to provoke the MCP change of strategy. This current consensus
is not only strong, but has deep roots. As long ago as 1960, McLane was saying much
the same, that given so many reasons, no one factor (including the international)
could be deemed a necessary cause. He wrote that:
However one may weight the evidence of British “provocation” versus the evidence of a
calculated strategy by the party leadership, the mood of the Malayan Communists in the
spring of 1948 was such that an insurrection not very different from the one that broke
out in June would doubtless have developed before the end of the year … short of a
major shift in world communist strategy … British ‘provocation’ … did no more than
hasten [events].16
This ‘provocation’ included British coercive measures, in particular, increasing control
over labour matters and trade unions. The argument that the MCP was pushed into a
corner and given little choice by these was put most strongly by New Zealand scholar
Michael Stenson.17 Stenson lists a formidable battery of British measures. There
included use of trespass laws to remove union organisers from rubber estates and
other commercial property from late 1947, thus giving the appearance that they
were siding with employers. In the same period, police fired on strikers and demon-
strators on a number of occasions, with resulting fatalities almost entirely on the
protesting side. There was also the selective use of banishment orders in Singapore
against union and communist organisers alleged to have encouraged sedition, or
violence, and who were not born locally. Finally, the MCP became aware in early
1948 that the government was discussing more restrictive union legislation, which
ultimately arrived in the form of the Trade Union Ordinance of 31 May 1948.
13 See earlier footnote for the full reference to this.
14 A.J. Stockwell, ‘A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in Malaya’.
15 Hack, Defence and decolonisation, p. 116.
16 McLane, Soviet strategies, pp. 388–9.
17 M.R. Stenson, Industrial conflict, or repression and revolt: The origins of the 1948 communist insurrec-
tion in Malaya and Singapore, and ‘The Malayan Union and the historians’, Journal of Southeast Asian
History, 10, 2 (1969): 344–54. See also M.R. Stenson, ‘The 1948 communist revolt in Malaya: A note on
historical sources and interpretation’, and ‘A reply’ by Gerald de Cruz, both in the Institute of South East
Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 9, 1971.
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The Ordinance banned Federations of Trade Unions, except those organised by
trade. This was aimed against communist control of the Pan Malayan Federation of
trade unions in Malaya, and the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions. It ordered
that Trade Union officials should have three years trade experience, again, attempting
to rule out many of the communists’ semi-professional organisers.
More recently, MCP Secretary-General Chin Peng has developed a similar line.
The background to this is Chin Peng’s emergence since the end of the Cold
War. In December 1989 the MCP signed a peace accord with Thai and Malaysian
representatives. Since then, Chin Peng has waged a campaign to publicise his version
of events, notably at an academic seminar in Canberra in 1999, and through a book.
The latter comprises Chin Peng’s story as told to Ian Ward and Norma Miraflor, Alias
Chin Peng: My side of the story (2003). According to Chin Peng’s version of the
Emergency origins: ‘The decisive factor was the internal situation’, in other words
British repression. He emphasises the British refusal to listen to protests against the
dropping of more liberal citizenship proposals and of the Malayan Union
Constitution of 1946 and refusing to listen to the 1947 protests,18 the increase in
repression of labour organisation, and the new Trade Union legislation of May 1948.19
Elsewhere he states that ‘the prominent factor that influenced us, when we decided
to take up arms, was the British policy at the time. We felt we were being cornered,
gradually backed into the corner. We had nowhere to move. … Of course, the inter-
national factor played some role, but not as decisive as that.’20 He argues that, after
the ‘two camp’ theory was published in the Cominform journal of November 1947,
they nevertheless decided in December to continue the ‘united front’ policy. The com-
munal divisions in Malaya, and the people being ‘thirsty for peace’, made a change
seem wrong, despite the fact that it was the disgraced Lai Teck’s policy.
Chin Peng goes further, and dates the first real questioning of MCP policy to 31
January to 1 February 1948, when an unnamed ‘Politburo member’
raised the question… in Kuala Lumpur … He said I’m doubtful. Why? After three years
of peaceful struggle even though we could succeed in mobilising the masses, to organise
hartal, general strike and universal stoppage of shops and business. We even succeeded
to that extent, unprecedented in Malaya, the first time. We couldn’t force the British to
make a bit of concession. So what is the usefulness of continuing the peace struggle. That
sounded quite convincing. So all of us agreed to discuss the point he raised, not raised by
me. And next day, February first, in the process of discussing, we heard the booming
from the Padang, the artillery celebrating the set up of the Federation. We continued
to discuss, at last, more or less agreed we had to make a formal review of this policy.
But that was close to Chinese New Year, so we adjourned the meeting.
18 Notable amongst these was a front (All Malayan Council of Joint Action-Putera, Putera representing
leftwing Malay groups) against the new Malayan Federation constitution, which launched a widespread
hartal (strike=business closure) on 20 Oct. 1947. This was in support of a more democratic ‘People’s
Constitution’.
19 Chin Peng, with Ian Ward and Norma Miraflor, Alias Chin Peng: My side of the story (Singapore:
Media Masters, 2003). For a more critical view and a reliable, short biographical chapter, see also
Dialogues with Chin Peng, ed. C.C. Chin and Karl Hack (Singapore: Singapore University Press,
2004), specifically p. 121 for the above point.
20 Dialogues, p. 117.
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So according to Chin Peng the meeting recommenced after Chinese New Year, and
finally decided Lai Teck had been wrong to halt the armed struggle. Hence they called
a March Central Committee meeting to discuss it. He further argues that the ‘internal
situation’ predominated at the 17–21 March meeting, by which time they knew of the
Government’s proposed new Trade Union legislation (the 31 May Ordinance).21 He
acknowledges, as we will see below, that they also discussed international changes,
particularly the Indian Communist Party’s change to a more militant line (taken at
its Second Congress in February to early March). However, he interprets these as
not the primary concerns.
He argues also that the MCP’s decisions, taken in March and then at the May
1948 Central Executive Committee meetings, were fundamentally ‘defensive’ and
reactive. For instance, he turns on its head the orthodox Cold War interpretation
of Australian communist leader L. Sharkey’s attendance at the MCP’s March
1948 meeting. The orthodox interpretation was that Sharkey – the leader of the
Communist Party of Australia – transmitted Comintern instructions on the ‘two
camp’ thesis and the need for armed revolt. While Sharkey, en route from Calcutta
to Australia did attend the March MCP meeting, Chin Peng argues that he did not
transmit any instructions received in Calcutta. Instead, Sharkey’s most effective con-
tribution was to suggest a solution to the MCP’s labour failures based on Australian
experience. Indeed, if taken literally, Sharkey becomes almost the main culprit for the
Malayan Emergency. In Chin Peng’s words:
We launch many strikes but every time we failed. Either suppressed by the police, or
because we lacked funds to continue. So we were discussing whether we could adopt cer-
tain forms of violence to deal with the scabs. In that meeting, if Sharkey was not there to
provide certain advice to us, we would not have adopted the tactic to get rid of the scabs.22
According to Chin Peng the Central Committee was divided, and Sharkey’s advice
was decisive, given the Australian Communist Party’s reputation for being able to sus-
tain labour disputes.23
The March meeting therefore decided on ‘defensive violence’ to support labour
disputes. The May Central Committee meeting went further, and concluded that
the result of this policy would be increasing British repression— for instance the pro-
posed May 1948 Trade Union Amendment. It therefore called for gradually increasing
defensive violence up to and including an inevitable final people’s war. By June, there-
fore, the MCP were preparing their supporters for the ultimate ‘full-scale’ British
attack. In his words, ‘So we had to get our armed forces ready, our nucleus ready
before September. Not launching our armed uprising in September but get ready
before September. So when the full-scale attack happens, we can react.’ In the mean-
time, another Central Committee meeting was to be held in July or August, in time
21 Ibid., p. 121.
22 Ibid., p. 134.
23 It is interesting to read Chin Peng ‘against the grain’. On the one hand, the internal situation was
overwhelmingly decisive, on the other hand he – as did some Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) –
describes the Central Committee as ‘divided’. It was divided, but the external communist line, detailed
first and in full in the Central Committee’s March decisions and seemingly validated by events in
Czechoslovakia, would usually have been one source of authority in deciding such issues.
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(by the MCP’s reckoning) to make more detailed plans. These, it was expected, would
include a move to set up a headquarters in the fairly inaccessible interior of Pahang,
and a liberated state in mountainous parts of the northeastern state of Kelantan which
had harboured the MPAJA during the war.24
Chin Peng’s version therefore fits the ‘revisionist’ position fairly well, in arguing
that there was little international influence. He modifies it in accepting there was an
MCP plan of sorts, but sees this as a series of intended ‘defensive’ responses to
increasing British repression. Chin Peng’s version of events forms a bridge to the
next sections, which re-examine the historiography against original documents,
mostly from 1948 itself, and reads Chin Peng’s statements and actions ‘against the
grain’. These two sections deal firstly with the international communist line, and
secondly with the question of what MCP plans were in 1948.
New documents and approaches: Were there international
communist directives?
This section re-examines the sources in order to demonstrate that the ‘revisionist’
case of communist international influence in 1948 is misplaced. The revisionist case is
that there were no communist instructions for armed revolt, and that no such instruc-
tions were disseminated at the two Calcutta conferences of February 1948. But that
case is a crude rebuttal of a Cold War orthodoxy that McVey punctured as early as
1958. It is outmoded – indeed should have been outmoded even in the 1960s –
and naïve about how international communism worked in 1948.
I therefore propose a ‘neo-orthodox’ or ‘post-revisionist’ case that the change in the
communist international line was critical in causing a clustering of local revolts in 1948.
At the most, we could argue the communist international line ensured revolts where
otherwise they would not have happened that year (perhaps in India, Burma and possibly
Malaya too). At the least, we must insist that the Soviet role needs to be given greater
weight within nuanced, multi-causal models of the outbreak of the ‘Asian Cold War’.
This is not, of course, to deny that much of what the revisionist line claims is
useful. It is certainly true that the MCP felt under multiple pressures in early 1948,
from the defection of Lai Teck, new labour legislation, its failure to persuade the
British to drop the federal constitution, and more. It is true that, despite the decisions
of March and May, the MCP was far from ready to launch a full revolt by June 1948.
In fact, many cadres were arrested before they could flee. In addition, it is true that
some orthodox Cold War accounts of the Emergency origins did portray events far
too simplistically as caused by ‘instructions’ relayed from Moscow and through
Calcutta, whether for internal or external propaganda reasons, or sometimes because
they honestly came to believe this.25
But the starting point for re-evaluating events is the realisation that the Cold War
orthodoxy on ‘instructions’ is an irrelevance, doubted by some even at the time.
Worse, it leads to scholars asking the wrong questions about 1948, notably: were
there instructions from Moscow for a revolt? Even in 1948, some British officials
were groping towards a more subtle view than the full Cold War orthodoxy: one
24 See Dialogues, pp. 135 and 136–7 for the plans.
25 Stockwell, ‘A widespread and long-concocted plot’, pp. 80–3, dealt with such issues.
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that did not assume a straightforward dissemination of Moscow’s orders through
Calcutta or anywhere else. Officials in the office of Britain’s Commissioner-General
for Southeast Asia (located in Singapore) – Britain’s premier regional centre – are
interesting in this respect. In late 1948 they traced how regional parties aligned
with a change in the prestigious international communist line over a period of
months. They tried to show how local parties tailored their lines to local conditions,
starting even before the Calcutta meetings.
The best illustration of this sort of analysis is a little-used November 1948
document from the Commissioner-General’s Office. In November 1948 the
Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia sent the Foreign Office a detailed sum-
mary. This claimed that Soviet theorist Zhdanov’s report to Cominform of
September 1947, ‘For a Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy’, as published in
the Cominform journal of November, was soon disseminated in India, Malaya and
Burma. It particularly noted local parties accepting, in the following three to four
months, Zdhanov’s criticism of optimistic illusions. Additionally, it attached a chart
with over 30 stages of evidence of such dissemination. What follows are just a few
of the key dates the chart traces:26
1. 10. 11.1947. Zhdanov’s report on the International Situation is published in the
first issue of the Cominform Journal – having been developed at end
September.
3. 7.12.47-17.12.47 Communist Party of India (CPI) accepts paper on ‘Present Policy
and Tasks of the CPI’ and criticises former ‘opportunistic
illusions’…
5. 25.12.47 Mao’s report to Central Executive Committee (CEC) [of the Chinese
Communist Party] echoes Zhdanov’s report….
8. 1.2.48- Communists from all over the world arrive in Calcutta for the
Southeast Asia Youth and Student Conference…
10. Feb.48 Probably the 1st Politburo of Burma Communist Party decides to
adopt a policy of ‘open resistance’.
11. 19.2.48 Southeast Asia Youth Conference opens….
13. 22.2.48 (1) Lawrence SHARKEY, President Australian CP, passes through
Singapore en route to 2nd Party Congress of CPI, Calcutta.
(2) Burma CP delegates leave Rangoon for Calcutta.
14. 28.2.48 2nd Party Congress CPI opens in Calcutta – numerous foreign
delegates present. THAN TUN of BCP states his party striving to
forge links with Chinese CP…
16. 5.3.48 (1) 2nd Party Congress of CPI passes main political resolution at
closed session, calling for new policy of opposition to Nehru
Government.
(2) In Rangoon, BOC Workers’ Union, under chairmanship of its
leader, a prominent communist agitator, decided to strike from
9.3.48. H.N. GHOAL believed to be in Rangoon directing action.
26 TNA: FO371=69695, Commissioner-General’s Office (Singapore) to Southeast Asia Department of
FO, 24 November 1948, including 10 Nov. 1948 memorandum and attachments.
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17. 6.3.48 Closed session of CPI Party Congress passes resolution criticising
past policy of CPI.
18. 7.3.48. Open Session of CPI Congress deposes JOSHI and elects BT
RANADIVE as new General Secretary of CPI.
WICKRAMASINGHE, leader of Communist Party of Ceylon,
announces his party has made similar mistakes to those of CPI…
21. 20.3.48– Central Executive Committee of MCP approves plan for armed
revolt. Produces thesis ‘The Existing Situation’…27
The full account interweaves events across South and Southeast Asia, trying to demon-
strate a discernable shift, with the language of that shift reflecting the ‘two camp’ line.
For instance, it attached the key MCP paper ‘The existing situation’, as tabled at the
critical MCP Central Executive Meeting of 17–21 March 1947. This repeated the
‘two camp’ Zhdanov formula and pronounced cooperation with the British Labour
Party useless. ‘Under these circumstances’, the paper demanded full independence
(not the self-government previously demanded) and pronounced ‘the people’s revolu-
tionary war’ to be ‘inevitable’, with ‘armed struggle’ of particular significance. In
addition, the Malayan Security Service reported (contrary to Chin Peng’s later claims)
that CCP advice from Chou En-lai had been that revolt was ultimately necessary in
colonial territories.28
It is difficult to understand just how loyal the document is to the logic and
language of the new international line without seeing the document as a whole.
But some highlights can easily demonstrate that the international line was far from
peripheral. The document ‘The existing situation’ began with the words ‘A fundamen-
tal change has taken place in the post-war international situation…’. It proceeded to a
detailed recounting of the ‘two camps’ thesis of Zhdanov, and how the colonial
territories could play an important part in preventing capitalist countries from
preparing for war or going to war. It then added that:
Under these circumstances, it is imperative that a new method must be adopted for the
colonial people’s struggle. This is by establishing a united front with the lower stratum of
workers and peasants as its foundation, by abandoning and delivering a blow to those
few renegades of the upper stratum and by a widespread rallying of the masses, by
means of practical action, to defeat the Imperialist policy and strive for complete inde-
pendence and emancipation. And under the many phases of the situation, and armed
struggle (i.e. the people’s revolutionary war [my emphasis]) is inevitable…29
27 The shorthand ‘plan for an armed revolt’ could mislead: what it produced was a plan for defensive
labour action, which it was believed would also help prepare the ground for an eventual, inevitable armed
struggle.
28 RHL: MSS13=1948, 15.7.48, p. 500, and MSS Supplement 7=1948, 15.7.48. MSS Supplement 7=1948,
15.7.48, has one secret source saying an MCP representative went to Hong Kong (this would presumably
be Chin Peng) and saw Liau Sen Tzu. Liau cabled Chou En-lai who replied that for a communist revolt in
a colony bloodshed was the only means of success. The informant supposedly heard this at a meeting of
Perak officials in May when reorganisation plans were discussed.
29 TNA, UK (TNA): FO371=69695, Commissioner General’s Office (Singapore) to Southeast Asia
Department of FO, 24 Nov. 1948, including 10 Nov. 1948 memorandum and attachments.
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The decisions as a whole were firmly anchored in, and justified by, the changing
international communist line. Armed rebellion was thus presented – in March – as
the inevitable end result, but the emphasis was for the moment on preparation, on
preparing a front of the lower workers and peasants. This last reflected the conclusion
that the alliance with the bourgeoisie, in the AMCJA-Putera front of 1947 for
instance, had failed.
The same language was repeated in a statement published in the Chinese-
language paper Voice of the People on 20 April 1948, which sought to explain and
justify the new policy to the rank and file. Entitled ‘Understand the situation, master
the orientation’, this began by arguing that the previous illusions of the British Labour
Party had been stripped away, revealing it for the tool of international capitalism and
the imperial force that it was. In trying to argue that the party’s supporters were
strong – by implication strong enough to ‘continue their struggle along the bloody
footprints of those who had gone before’ – the document also emphasised that ‘the
broad masses of the Malayan people are part of the world anti-imperialist democratic
camp’. This document, however, being intended for consumption by a broad base of
supporters, gave over more time to addressing the particularities of British policy,
countering doubts, and making suggestions for correct policy and reliance on the
working classes. Despite that, it was in effect a reassurance that a drift to violence
accorded with international circumstances.
In addition to the MCP’s secret decisions of March, and its public statement of
April, a close reading of the documentation casts doubt on Chin Peng’s spin on
Sharkey’s role at the March Central Committee meeting. Chin Peng claims Sharkey
had little influence over this meeting, except to suggest a means of strengthening
mass organisation in this next stage: an anti-scab policy including murder. But at
least one Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP— an official term for surrendered com-
munists) claimed to have seen more explosive advice. In November 1948 this Leong
Yat Seng told his British interrogators that there was
a letter from the President of the Australian Communist Party criticising the MCP in its
Trade Union Policy. The letter said that the MCP should adopt the same tactics as the
Communist Party of Indochina viz, Liberation War.30
We cannot know whether such advice was given, but even if it was not, it seems
likely that Sharkey’s presence in March, combined with his supposed practical knowl-
edge, was being used to help justify the shift to more violent tactics. The argument that
a risky shift to violence was supported by other world figures, and fitted with world
communist policy, was not unimportant when the actual conditions in Malaya –
particularly in terms of deep communal differences – were so unripe for revolt.
Another informant knew of no ‘instructions’ nor of a Calcutta conference even,
but did know that Sharkey (identified by his post) had criticised the MCP for
missing its opportunity immediately after the war when the international situation
30 RHL, Brewer papers, interrogation of Leong Yat Seng on 23 Nov.1948, section on ‘Influence of
Foreign Communist Parties’. Leong Yat Seng was a rather talkative (English-speaking) surrendered com-
munist. He made no attempt to hide his efficiency as a communist organiser, using this to provide
ferocious levels of detail.
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was discussed.31 This and early June articles in communist newspapers lauding
the Indochina example, raise questions. The Singapore Intelligence Far East (SIFE)
organisation also had Sharkey as one of the people criticising the Indian Communist
Party at its Second Congress in Calcutta in February 1948, just before the latter changed
General Secretary and adopted a more aggressive policy.32 The others criticising CPI
policy were Than Tun of Burma and Wickremasinghe of Ceylon=Sri Lanka, suggesting
almost an emerging consensus that communist parties should harden their policies
towards bourgeois leaders, and rely more on workers and lower bourgeosie (a shift
to a ‘united front from below’ as opposed to the former ‘united front from above’).33
Then Sharkey turned up in Singapore at theMarchMCPmeeting, and theMCP shortly
afterwards adopted motions in similar ‘two camp’ language, with a similar acceptance
that violence was inevitable. In short, if we abandon ‘Orthodox Cold War’ notions of
Sharkey and others bringing orders, we can see that nevertheless by February to March
1948 there was almost a regional consensus – or at least conversation – on the import of
the changed international line.
While we can still argue about how far the changing international line – and its
discussion and reception across Asia – caused or merely coloured events, and how far
the consensus was manufactured in Asia itself, it would be difficult to deny that it
provided the language in which the critical decisions were debated.
We should also note that the May 1948 Central Committee meeting confirmed
the need to prepare for eventual armed revolt. That was a working out of the conse-
quences of the March policy in action, as British repression increased and a new
Trade Union ordinance was about to be published (end of May, effective
mid-June). The May Fifth Plenum of the MCP’s CC adopted a 12-point ‘plan of
struggle’, emphasising illegal work from then on, using strikes to disrupt the economy,
assaulting the democratic parties and bourgeoisie including the Kuomintang
(Guomindang), and proposed measures to attract peasant and intellectual support.34
I want to suggest a model for the influence of the Soviet line, and for its role in
the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency. It helps if we remind ourselves again that
most ‘revisionist’ literature (that is, almost all the relevant specialist literature on
Malaysia of the last two decades) starts with the wrong question, being: Did
Moscow issue directives, passed on at two Calcutta conferences in February 1948,
which caused the opening of a new, Southeast Asian front in the Cold War? They
therefore arrive at the easy answer: No.
We need to ask a different question, namely: what influence did the international
communist line have in 1948? This results in a very different answer. We see that
Zhdanov’s ‘two camp’ line was being disseminated amongst Asian parties by late
31 RHL, MSS Supplement 7=1948, 15.7.48.
32 TNA FO371=69694, SIFE paper of 23 Apr. 1948, ‘Review of communism in Southeast Asia’, no. 12,
15 Apr. 1948.
33 Lee Soong, the NDYL (New Democratic Youth League) leader who attended the Calcutta Youth
Conference, did not attend the March CC meeting, and is on this matter a red herring not worth further
space. The SIFE paper did not detect any similar change in Malaya. With Lai Teck gone, it seems it some-
times took some time for communist directives to be uncovered. The same paper noted the Indian and
Burmese parties had changed policy dramatically and simultaneously. This led to the banning of the CP
in West Bengal, and strikes and then the banning of the BCP on 27 March.
34 Charles McLane, Soviet strategies in Southeast Asia, p. 387, summarises.
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1947, causing at first a tentative reappraisal and, by February 1948, a widespread and
dramatic reappraisal of policies in parties across much of Asia.35 The Communist
Party of the Soviet Union’s ‘international line’ and criticism of past optimism and uni-
ted front policies was influential, and discussed region-wide. As such, it had weight
when local parties debated their next actions, particularly where local conditions
had previously been thought unpropitious for armed revolt, or local parties were in
a state of ambivalence following setbacks.
In some cases, where local conditions had been thought ambivalent at best, the
international line may have played a critical role that year. Perhaps in Burma (and
despite Burmese independence in January 1948), the international line may have
helped swing debate in favour of armed revolt.36 It is true that the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) reportedly told Chin Peng that local parties had to interpret
the international line in the context of local conditions, but that was little more than a
truism.37
This interpretation of how the ‘international line’ worked was long ago
explained by Ralph Smith, though for a slightly later date.38 That is, local parties
drew strength not just from the prestige and success of the Soviet Union (the
People’s Republic of China too from 1949), but from being part of a scientific
world movement. As such, any international ‘line’ propagated by the CPSU had
to be engaged with, indeed was often eagerly engaged with. We should perhaps
go further, and add that local players were not passive recipients. Harry Poeze’s
article on Indonesia in this issue, for instance, raises the question of how far
Indonesian communist Muso was an emissary of a strict line or instructions from
Moscow in August 1948, or how far he was perhaps over-enthusiastic, in taking
on the role of bringer of the new international line. This obviously suited his desire
for eminence after a long exile, and probably reflected the infectious enthusiasm of
his communist hosts in Prague, who had taken more complete control of their own
country in February 1948. It is certainly the case that some officials in Moscow were
not entirely sure whether he might overdo it, and alienate people locally.
Unfortunately for the Indonesian party, he was all too successful in firing them
up, and alarming opponents, with dreadful results at Madiun in September.39 The
question is therefore not just how a Moscow line was transmitted, but which indi-
viduals and groups locally took up and used that line in their own debates, and
to serve their own needs. Moscow could not always predict what local reception
would be, and it seems in some instances may have been diffident about advising
on situations it knew it did not fully comprehend.40
35 McVey, Calcutta Conference, pp. 1–24.
36 See, for instance, Harper, Forgotten wars, pp. 379–80; McLane, Soviet strategies in Southeast Asia;
and TNA, FO371=69695.
37 Chin and Hack, Dialogues, pp. 133–4, 142 n25.
38 Ralph B. Smith, ‘China and Southeast Asia: The revolutionary perspective, 1951’, Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies, 19, 1 (1988): 97–110.
39 See ‘The Cold War in Indonesia’ by Harry Poeze in this issue.
40 See ‘Did the Soviet Union instruct Southeast Asian communists to revolt?’ by Larisa Efimova in this
issue.
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New documents and approaches: Was there a communist plan?
The ‘revisionist’ approach to MCP planning also begins with the wrong question.
It asks: ‘Did the MCP have a plan to begin armed violence in June 1948? As with the
revisionist approach to international communist planning, the obvious answer is no.
But then the question is itself flawed. The real questions we should be asking are: what
were the MCP’s plans, as laid out in its March and May 1948 CC meetings, and after-
wards? What were their implications? These open questions are far more useful than
the leading one which invites a simple yes=no answer.
What I want to do now is to start with Chin Peng’s interpretation of MCP plans,
and then afterwards examine communist documents from the period in question,
before answering this new question. Chin Peng has emphasised that the MCP were
unprepared for revolt in June 1948. He has presented the MCP as pushed reluctantly
into revolt by government repression. He accepts that its March and May 1948
decisions did provide a programme of preparations for violence, but argues this
was a ‘defensive’ posture in response to increasing British repression, and closing
down of democratic space. He also accepts that the MCP anticipated that action
and reaction between the two sides was expected to lead to large-scale armed conflict,
though only in or after September 1948.
Here it is best, perhaps, to let Chin Peng speak for himself. Here is his most
relevant exchange with historians in Canberra at the 1999 gathering:
Chin Peng: … At that time, before the emergency, we expect the British to step up their
attack, to the extent of banning the trade unions and banning our party … Because we
use violence in the strike [the March 1948 decision to step up labour violence]… of
course the government will react…. Then, how to respond? In the last resort, we have
to launch armed struggle.
Anthony Short: But Min Sheng Pau [a communist-run newspaper] was talking about
armed struggle in early June […]. Why would they?
Chin Peng: That was to prepare public opinion. … we estimate, the earliest the
Government will launch the attack is in September … So we had to get our armed forces
ready, our nucleus ready before September. Not launching our armed uprising on
September. So when the full-scale attack happens, we can react…
…Guerrilla warfare was the best form. And why we didn’t make a plan but only a
very rough idea, no plan was made? We planned to hold a meeting before September.41
Chin Peng further insisted that: ‘The decisive factor was the internal situation’, which he
specifies as British repression of labour activism, and unwillingness to respond to pro-
tests against the newMalayan Federation.42 But we must take into account Chin Peng’s
41 Chin and Hack, Dialogues, pp. 135–6, passim. The Dialogues have three advantages. First, in them
Chin Peng is questioned, allowing more than one viewpoint. Secondly, at Canberra (where the conversa-
tions which the Dialogues record took place) Chin Peng tried out parts of a first draft for his memoirs,
and seems to have included insights from those sessions (and background papers) in revising them for
Alias Chin Peng. Thirdly, Alias Chin Peng not only builds on Canberra, but integrates work by Ian Ward
as co-writer. However, Alias Chin Peng is detailed. The two books should be understood as part of an
ongoing process of creating and critiquing Chin Peng’s version of the events.
42 Ibid., p. 121.
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aims. These include showing that the MCP were a vital part of the nationalist struggle
for independence, and so acknowledging external influences does not sit well with this
aim. As we have already seen, however, the March 1948 documents were written in the
language of international communism and of Cominform’s ‘two camp’ theory.
Chin Peng’s version of events thus fits into the broad ‘revisionist’ interpretation of
1948, in denying significant outside influence, and in denying the communists had firm
plans for the events which gave rise to the Emergency.43 Within this paradigm, he takes
Stenson’s argument for the MCP being reactive to British control of labour policy, and
closing down of political space, one step further. For instance, he emphasises that, when
the MCP CC took its May 1948 decisions to prepare for defensive war, they already
knew that the new Trade Union Ordinance of 31 May 1948 was pending.
In short, there may not have been a formal, written document or finalised MCP
plan. But there was an outline programme or informal plan by mid-1948, one
intended to end in armed rebellion. This aimed to prepare the ground by increasing
labour violence and targeting enemies of the workers such as European planters.
Small platoons were also to be mobilised as the basis for later guerrilla expansion.
After government repression, they would finally begin full mobilisation, establish a
Pahang headquarters, and liberate certain isolated areas of Kelantan, in the north.
Thus when Chin Peng later called the three murders of European managers of 16
June a ‘mistake’ (they happened in his own state of Perak), what he meant is that they
went too far for that particular time. That is, these ‘three’ murders on one day (actu-
ally five, most people discounting the two Asian assistants murdered at the same time,
but elsewhere) prematurely triggered the final stage. Chin Peng’s version is thus that
by May 1948 the British fully intended to increase pressure on the MCP, and the MCP
had a ‘defensive’ programme of action, which it was anticipated would both prepare
the people and gradually provoke greater British repression. The MCP ‘plan’ or rather
loose programme, was therefore for a series of defensive moves which, it was antici-
pated, would result in ‘defensive’ resort to full armed revolt in or shortly after
September 1948. Trigger factors would include the banning of the party. The MCP
would meet sometime before September – probably in July or August – to finalise
their plans for the last ‘defensive’ stage.
The question then is: Do documents from 1948 confirm the revisionist emphasis on
the MCP not having a firm plan in June 1948? Do they alter Chin Peng’s ‘revisionist +
defensive plans versus increasing government repression’ interpretation? Or, alterna-
tively, do they suggest a more aggressive MCP stance, and more concrete MCP plans?
The March 1948 MCP Central Committee decisions (discussed above) are of
relatively little help to us in this respect. They were indeed heavily couched in the
‘two camps’ language of Cominform, with its assumption of inevitable conflict. Yet
the immediate plans appear to have concentrated merely on increasing control of
labour, and preparing the masses. The question is whether this was Chin Peng’s
‘defensive’ stance, or a more aggressive preparation of mass control for later revolt.
It is worth noting the events of June 1948 involved a change in the scale of
intimidation – from violence to murder – rather than something entirely new.
The Malayan Security Service (MSS) noted that the Workers’ Self Protection
43 Chin Peng, with Ian Ward and Norma Miraflor, Alias Chin Peng. See also, Dialogues with Chin Peng.
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Corps – who used violence to ‘protect’ union activities – had been a fixture before
March 1948.44 Chin Peng’s version has this as a defensive move — and certainly
the government had used the police to break strikes where there was violence or
occupation of property, sometimes with loss of life. But at the same time, there are
indications that as this policy got off the ground in April, it was far from merely a
defensive use of violence against kongchak (labour thieves or scabs) and notorious
employers. Instead, it seems to have been an attempt to consolidate control over
labour and populations through eliminating or intimidating opposition.
Hence the MSS detected an attempt to use the Singapore Harbour Labour Union
for politically motivated strikes in April, to be followed by a 1 May mass rally of
100,000. In the words of an MSS report this was intended to be:
A mass assembly and procession of 100,000 labourers through the streets of Singapore,
controlled and directed by the Malayan Communist Party marshals and the Singapore
Worker Protection Corps. It was their intention that the whole of the centre of
Singapore would be under the control of the Communists and any interference by the
Police would be met by violence. The experience of the funeral procession of the notorious
Communist LIM AH LIANG in August 1947 gave the party every reason to be confident
of their success. The result of the show of force would intimidate the population of
Singapore and would be followed by sympathy strikes from the Harbour workers which
would spread … culminating in the complete stoppage of all essential services, shipping,
transport, etc. … to coincide with further incitement to violence in the Federation of
Malaya.
Surrendered Enemy Personnel such as Leong Yat Seng confirmed this. Leong had
become a communist in February 1947, a member of the Open Section of the
Naval Base Harbour Union, and during the Emergency, joined the Liberation
Army. He describes April to May plans to hide many organisers, and press strikes.
He said it had been intended ‘at the appropriate time … to join forces with other
organisations in Singapore, and to burn down godowns, blow up ammunition
dumps and obtain supplies of food, money, etc. for the forces up-country’. Arrests
had intervened, persuading him to flee up-country, ‘guided by a lady with one eye
much bigger than the other’.45
This particular MCP plan was cut off by selective banishments of labour leaders,
arrests of protection corps members, a 22 April order banning the procession, and
then further arrests of SHLU leaders who threatened to defy the ban. The SHLU
called off the procession on its eve. The Singapore government policy was to banish
any non-British subject (Chinese persons born in Singapore were British subjects)
who was implicated in labour intimidation or violence. Intimidation now included
sporadic use of grenades.46
44 RHL, MSS Indian Ocean s251, MSS PIJ, Supplement 11=1948, 15 Aug. 1948, pp. 3–4.
45 RHL, Brewer papers, interrogation of Leong Yat Seng on 23 Nov. 1948, section on ‘Influence of
Foreign Communist Parties’.
46 RHL, MSS Indian Ocean s251, MSS PIJ, Supplement 11=1948, 15 Aug. 1948, pp. 5–7. A grenade was
thrown into a coffee shop near the Singapore Harbour Board on 26 Apr. a tactic later popular in the
Emergency to terrorise MCA supporters.
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There was, in short, an escalating battle for labour control, in which MCP use of
violence was met by government banishments and arrests, and the latter were
followed by increasing arson and selective strikes in April to early May.
But the real question is how far, and how soon, the MCP strategy became much
more ambitious in its scope. The MSS analysis, albeit of August, was that the aim had
been to secure union control by violence, and use labour control to soften up the
population. In other words, it was a way of preparing the ground for full-scale revolt.
But other evidence suggested, rightly or wrongly, much worse.
A 23 June statement by a detained Chinese MCP Area Representative (Political
Section) in Perak certainly suggests a more aggressive, proactive policy preparing
the ground. Under the title of ‘MCP Organisation and Policy’, the prisoner stated that:
They have realised that Britain will never give up Malaya after losing India, while a self-
government under Britain is of no use at all in the MCP opinion. It must be an absol-
utely independent communist state. To attain their object, they have decided that the
first thing is to eliminate all opposition. Anyone not for the MCP is against the MCP
and must be eliminated – hence the recent killings. The common phrase ‘Kong Chak’
(labour thief) is used for all those against the MCP. By eliminating all opposition,
MCP would get full support of the people, and a democratic government could be
formed.47
A later source — an interrogation of SEP Tan Ah Leng from late 1948 (a Singapore-
born Hokkien rubber tapper, aged 24), fleshed out the techniques he had seen used in
the 1946–48 labour movement. First of all, apparent elections would be fixed, with
those to be elected decided by the MCP beforehand
By careful propaganda and persuasion those … selected will be elected. Should the
workers not wish to have those men … the Communist Party will start a campaign of
propaganda … to persuade them to reject their original choice … If for example a
chairman is elected by workers contrary to expectations … he is allowed to stand, but
is invited to join the MCP. If he becomes a member he is sworn to secrecy … Should
he reveal a secret he will be court-martialled and shot. If he does not become a member
he is marked down for execution.
According to Tan Ah Leng, the workers ‘clearly understood’ that it was in their best
interests to ‘follow the men who make the speeches’.48 This corroborates the source
quoted above, that ‘the first thing is to eliminate all opposition … Anyone not for
the MCP is against the MCP and must be eliminated – hence the recent killings’,
with contractors as prime targets. Other sources talked of gradations of warnings
for opponents to cease, leave or, as the last resort, face punishment.49 At some
point, then, Chin Peng’s ‘defensive’ violence against labour thieves, supposedly
47 Selection of MCP documents and related intelligence attached to TNA F0371=6843845, Commissioner
General’s Office (P.S. Scrivener) to South East Asia Department, FO, 24 Nov. 1948, Enclosure on
‘Re-orientation of communist policy in South East Asia – Sequence of events’. The interpretation here fits
with Chin Peng’s discussion of Sharkey, and the March decision to adopt a ‘scab’ policy.
48 RHL, Brewer Papers, Interrogation of Tan Ah Leng, 1948.
49 RHL, MSS Supplement 7=1948, 15. 7, 48, A2 source on kongchak. See also TNA: CO537=4246, ‘Senai
Documents’, found on detainee Tan Siew Hoe when arrested at Senai, Johor.
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encouraged by Sharkey, transmuted into a violent struggle to control the entire labour
movement, and also to eliminate others who stood in the way of the MCP, including
KMT sympathisers.
We cannot be sure exactly how the transition was made from selective violence in
support of labour control to more widespread assassination. What we do know is that
in May 1948 the MCP CC met and issued the new orders described above, which were
more practical measures to prepare for revolt.
This coincided with an increase in murders, culminating in 19 cases of murder or
attempted murder in the first two weeks of June.50 The end of May was also important
in that this was the month that Lai Teck’s betrayal was finally announced to rank and
file members.51
As early as June, MSS sources suggested that the MCP aimed at an eventual
all-out attack, but with three stages to prepare the ground. To quote the MSS sum-
mary of its intelligence:
7. The [Central Committee] has decided that in the present campaign the MCP will
attack all out. There will be three main phases. They are (20=6=48 [the date the infor-
mation was secured]): –
i. the organisation of labour unrest [evident from April 1948]
ii. terrorism-murder of labour contractors, traitors, capitalists, members of the KMT,
kepalas, planters, tin-miners and ‘key’ Government officials [this intensified in
May and June, leading the British to declare the Emergency]
iii. when the chaos resulting from (ii) above has been completed, then armed revolution,
supported by strong forces of guerrillas from the hills.52
According to this MSS assessment, ‘During the second stage the MCP hope to weaken
Government considerably. They intend to murder detectives, police, MSS, and other
key Government personnel, which they hope will wreck the morale of the
remainder.’53
Simultaneously with phase ii, the MCP had set up ‘secret’ State Committees by
April. A report from the end of April suggested the successor to the wartime
MPAJA organisation was already compiling fresh lists of names, to facilitate any
emergency call up By early June – before the Emergency declaration – it was calling
up ex-MPAJA and others to form small mobile groups, which could later form the
platform for guerrilla groups. Some SEP reported being warned to go underground
before May.54 Registration itself was reportedly complete by 14 June. By that point
its ‘secret’ members had already been mobilised as mobile units or special service
corps, though not its open members. The MSS was getting intelligence on where
specific area mobile units were based.55 On 11 June the ex-MPAJA leadership met
in Kuala Lumpur under President Lau Yew. They ordered preparations to be made
50 RHL: MSS supplement 15=1948, p. 14.
51 RHL: MSS PIJ 12=1948, 30.6.48, p. 12, in a document dated 29 May 1948.
52 RHL: MSS PIJ 12=1948, 30.6.1948, Appendix A, p. 3.
53 Ibid.
54 RHL: Brewer papers, interrogation of Leong Yat Seng on 23 Nov. 1948.
55 RHL: MSS PIJ 12=1948, 30.6.1948, Appendix A, p. 4 and 7.
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to sell all its property, the destruction of records and preparation for mobilisation to
the hills, and all future orders to be given verbally. The banning of the MCP and sat-
ellite organisations was to be the signal for general mobilisation, and a 14 June report
suggested 500 men could be mobilised in Selangor within three days of the order
coming.56
On 15 June a Min Sheng Pao editorial on ‘Complete exposure of the cruel coun-
tenance’, described British policy as imperialist, fascist and anti-democratic, suppo-
sedly making union work impossible, adding that: ‘Today what Imperialism wants
is the gun and not the law … The Malayan history will repeat once more that of
1942–1945. Imperialism has openly declared war on the people and pointed its
guns at their chests.’ The message was stark: 1948 was 1942, and the people ‘will
remember the methods used against the Fascists’.57
The MCP plan was wrecked, since Chin Peng and his colleagues failed to antici-
pate the early British declaration of an Emergency, locally on 16 June and throughout
Malaya by 18 June. They had already ordered key personnel to move into secret
locations, or at least not to stay in one place, but nevertheless they were pitched
into the full-scale stage half-prepared.58 Hence the MSS quickly realised that the
MCP would not complete mobilisation until September 1948, and the three-stage
guerrilla strategy for the war itself was hastily improvised. By July 1948 this was
already known to involve a classic Maoist three stage strategy of:
i. Guerrilla warfare and demoralisation of the country;
ii. Establishment of a Communist regime in ‘liberated country areas’, including the Gua
Musang=Pulai area in the mountainous region of the northeastern state of Kelantan
(a wartime stronghold).
iii. Attacks on towns and the amalgamation of towns with the ‘liberated areas’.59
This ambitious policy was proposed by a party which, in December 1947, had still
been doubtful that objective conditions in the country suited revolt, and concerned
about how to inform members that the party’s former Secretary General was a traitor
and had fled with party funds in February to March 1947.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is clear that the language of the Cominform, and changes in the
international communist line, did colour internal communist party debates within
Asia in late 1947 to 1948. It is clear that the MCP and other parties did regard
themselves as part of an international as well as a local communist movement, and
listened with interest to Soviet and later to Chinese lines. The precise interpretation
56 Ibid., Appendix A, p. 5.
57 TNA: CO537=4246, Translation of Min Sheng Pao editorial of 15.6.1948, signed by ‘Ng Khin Gee’.
The British fell into the MCP trap by failing to ensure minimum force when responding to MCP and
worker organisation, with deaths resulting from police intervention on estates in early June. See also
translated Min Sheng Pau editorial 4 June 1948. Interestingly, though, a sub-theme in this and other
MCP documents was that of the imperialists dropping their ‘gentlemen-like masks’.
58 RHL: MSS PIJ 12=1948, 30.6.1948, Appendix A, p. 5.
59 RHL: MSS 13=1948, PIJ, 15.7.48, p. 479.
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and impact varied from country to country, and in Malaya it is true that many scho-
lars have argued, or implied, that armed revolt in 1948 was over-determined. When
scholars such as Stockwell stress the interaction of the international line with overrid-
ing local needs they thus confirm the revisionist line, and parts of Chin Peng’s recent
testimony.60
However, re-reading the full range of contemporary documents available in
British archives (in combination with reading Chin Peng’s testimony ‘against the
grain’) it does seem that this revisionist line will need adjusting both for our under-
standing of how international communism impacted on local events, and on what
sort of plans the MCP had made by mid-1948.
It is still difficult to be precise about the role of international changes in the
Emergency’s origins. Even at the time, the Malayan Security Service vacillated
between suggesting external influence, and accepting that the ‘immediate cause’
could possibly have been internal, for instance over Lai Teck, union controls and
the inauguration of the Federation. In this situation it is certainly safer to fall back
on the argument that revolt in Malaya was ‘overdetermined’, but that in addition
the ‘revisionist’ line posed the wrong questions and so needs revising to allow more
international impact as part of this ‘over-deterministic’ bundle.61 That said, the
evidence does suggest that changes in the international communist line were a
more integral part of decisions and events, and perhaps more necessary to the final
outcome, than even this new position might allow.
An alternative model, designed to better capture the significance of the inter-
national dimension, might work as follows. It might first insist that current ‘revisio-
nist’ historiography of the origins of the Malayan Emergency is flawed. That is, it asks
‘were there communist instructions for revolt in 1948’ and, ‘did the MCP have plans
for full-scale revolt for June 1948’. These questions were dictated by opposing a Cold
War orthodoxy that held there were instructions, which did lead to MCP plans for
revolt in mid-1948. But in reality the questions are misplaced: they are a case of look-
ing for ghosts rather than thieves. We now need new questions, based on a more
realistic understanding of how international communism worked in 1948, and of
what the MCP’s plans and intentions were. This approach could run roughly as
follows, adjusting our understanding of 1948 in at least two ways.
1. The international communist line should be accepted as influential in 1948.62
The question asked should now be: ‘What was the international communist line,
when did it reach particular communists, how did local individuals and factions
incorporate it into their own plans and debates, and hence what was its reception?’
For 1948 this is helped by the fact that, as yet, the CPSU was still the undisputed
main centre of dissemination for an international communist line. By 1950 it becomes
more complicated, as there are then multiple centres of ideological inspiration (CPSU,
CCP, and tangentially Yugoslavia). But in 1948 it was clearly the Soviet line that
dominated. Only after the decision to move towards armed conflict was taken did
the repertoire or archive of guerrilla techniques derived from wartime and CCP
60 Deery, ‘Malaya, 1948: Britain’s Asian Cold War’, p. 48.
61 Hack, Defence and decolonisation, p. 116. See also RHL, Supplement 8=1948, 31.7.48, p. 21.
62 Smith ‘China and Southeast Asia: The revolutionary perspective, 1951’.
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Maoist experience help constitute tactics on the ground. It was a case of Moscow for
strategy, China increasingly for guerrilla and later for political tactics too, and local
experience for adjustments.
The change from a united front to a ‘two camps’ line in late 1947 patterned
events across much of Asia in 1947–48, and shaped the language of change. Only
this can explain why even parties in newly independent countries, and where much
of the local leadership had previously acknowledged conditions as not propitious,
turned to armed revolt at proximate times. Only this can explain the clustering of
events and dramatic contrast during these two years. Even in Malaya, where there
were multiple pressures for a change of policy (especially growing British controls,
and the failure to reverse the Malayan Federation policy), it was helpful if not vital
in overcoming doubts about the conditions for revolt, and consequent divisions
within the MCP’s CC. It allowed some CC members to suggest, with a realistic chance
of being listened to, a change of line even though the December 1947 CC meeting had
accepted that conditions were not propitious for armed revolt.
The same December 1947 meeting had arrived at that cautious conclusion
despite coming just months after Lai Teck’s disappearance, and after they knew
their protests against the Malayan Federation were going to fail. While it is true
that the MCP may have been aware of the November 1947 Cominform journal at
this point (as Chin Peng claims), the full impact of that policy would not yet have
been absorbed. Yet almost simultaneously the new line was being debated in India,
Burma and Ceylon. Between late 1947 and February 1948 the communist parties in
these areas were moving towards a more aggressive stance. The debates, meanwhile,
were sometimes internal to the individual parties, sometimes through individuals, and
sometimes through meetings such as those in Calcutta. We need a more diffuse model
of how such a line worked at this time.
We should also remember that just because a communist party perceived the pro-
spects of open, legal politics and unionism as becoming weaker (as the MCP did by
late 1947 and even more so by early 1948), did not mean it would automatically
respond by armed revolt. This is where Chin Peng’s interpretation of early 1948 is
weak. Other possibilities, such as increased cell organisation, entryism, direction of
open organisations by secret and unacknowledged members, organisational work
and recruiting, intensified work to better penetrate non-Chinese communities, and
subversion, were all possible. That the MCP chose instead in March 1948 to move
towards open revolt, through phased increases in violence to prepare the population,
does still need explaining.
It particularly needs explaining as few perceptive MCP members could have been
unaware that inter-communal suspicions were running very high. The British had to
proceed very tentatively indeed to get conservative Malay and Chinese leaders
together in the Communities Liaison Committee in 1949, and that committee was
at first characterised by bitter arguments over citizenship and Chinese economic
dominance. It was 1952 before Malay and Chinese leaders first formed an effective
political partnership in the Alliance. The MCP’s particular choice of response may
therefore have been significantly influenced, if not caused, by the international line
and context. Yes, the internal situation strongly suggested the need for a change.
But no, the internal situation did not determine one necessary form for that change.
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The evidence for this is chronological (their December 1947 decision showed conti-
nuity and fears that the objective conditions were not right); contextual (their policy
changes replicate those of other parties in relatively unpropitious circumstances, such
as India and Indonesia); conflictual (supposedly there was opposition to the change)63
and documentary and textual (the March 1948 CC decisions, for instance, start and
are dominated by a reading of the international line, replicating the two camps dis-
course). As late as April, when the Central Committee issued and published a state-
ment in the Voice of the People to justify its more aggressive stance, it included a
whole paragraph on common objections, as follows:
There are some who believe that the masses in Malaya, especially the working class, are
still, backward; that Malaya is dominated by ‘races and abroad’ (or even claim that
Malaya has no indigenous racial group), and that as their motherland [China] conscious-
ness is strong, they are unwilling to participate in any anti-imperialist struggle in Malaya.
Some claim that the Malayan revolution is of a long-term nature and that the national-
democratic revolution should proceed at a slow pace; some even consider the future of
the revolution in Malaya to be uncertain and the chances of victory slim. They suggest
that it is only necessary to wait till victory in Chinese revolution before proceeding to
liberate Malaya. All these ideas are harmful … Those … have no fortitude to face the
bloody realities.64
All these objections were in fact valid, and the MCP’s rejection of them could only
really make sense in the context of a broader change of international communist
line and events. The statement elsewhere emphasised that opposition to the British
was now inevitable, because the British Labour Party had proved itself imperialist,
intent on intensifying exploitation for its own profit, and in support of America.
The point is, though, that the above objections are precisely the sort the Deputy
Secretary General Yeung Kuo expressed on 21 March 1948, and which could have,
with a different international line (and a more cautious Secretary General), resulted
in a different outcome.65 For in the end, Yeung Kuo’s objections were to prove accu-
rate. Malaya was not ready for revolution, and its ‘national’ question would prove
insuperable, as Chin Peng willingly admitted to scholars in 1999 interviews.66
The international line was thus one vital background factor. The changed inter-
national context that had helped to shape the new Soviet stance in the first place was
63 This area needs much more research. How much opposition was there, who by? It is mentioned in
the Special Branch ‘Basic Paper on the MCP’ of 1950, as cited by John Coe, ‘Beautiful flowers and poi-
sonous weeds’ (D. Phil., Queensland, 1993), p. 153. One section apparently argued armed revolt would
fail. See also Chin Peng, My side of history, p. 206, which mentions Yeung Kuo and one other as having
doubts.
64 Statement issued by the Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party in April 1948, later
published in Voice of the People, 20 Apr. 1948, supplied and translated by C.C. Chin.
65 Chin Peng, Alias Chin Peng, p. 206. Deputy Secretary General Yeung Kuo walked into the Queen
Street headquarters in Singapore just after the key decisions and according to Chin Peng said ‘I’m still
doubtful. Are we really prepared for this? Perhaps we should reconsider our position’ before questioning
whether ‘conditions’ were ‘ripe’ for armed struggle. Yeung Kuo and a second CC doubter ‘finally
accepted’ Chin Peng’s position on sticking to the decisions. See p. 201 by contrast for CC member
Ah Dian supporting change.
66 Chin Peng, Dialogues, pp. 225–32.
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also relevant. Together these made 1948 seem an appropriate time for armed revolt.
Indeed, the effects were immediate. The change in communist actions, such as the
communist takeover of government in Prague and ousting of non-communist part-
ners there, the changed tone in Soviet propaganda, and heightened violence in
Malaya too from April, increasingly convinced British policy-makers that the Cold
War was coming to Southeast Asia, and that as such their regional authorities needed
to design and coordinate coherent anti-communist policies.
Hence by February 1948 British regional authorities in Singapore had set up a
‘Special Planning Committee’ to address the increasing communist threat, which
reported back to the regional British Defence Coordinating Committee (Far East).67
In May, this Committee recommended a concerted approach, including: better pro-
paganda, stabilising governments, reducing racial discrimination, improving labour
relations and conditions through new labour codes, better trade union advice and
conciliation procedures, supporting centre-left parties, better school control through
registration and more inspectors, and more support for youth movements such as
Guides. Direct suppression was ruled out both as intolerable to London, and counter-
productive in driving communists underground where they became more difficult to
control, but it was suggested that governments ‘ensure that there was legislation in
readiness for suppression should it be needed’. By May, Singapore had already
taken the lead in appointing its own territory-specific committee.68 Regional commu-
nist movements were increasingly seen less as slightly misguided left-wing national-
ists, and more as a part of a worldwide movement determined to destroy western
values. This British reaction to the international communist drift away from open,
united front politics of course further cemented MCP beliefs that the united front
from above approach had failed.
Captured communist documents, meanwhile, confirm that good use was being
made of the international context in MCP literature. This was variously claiming
the MCP would be striking a blow (Iskra or ‘spark’ style) against the Western econ-
omies by hitting British dollar earnings, and that conflict between the two camps was
now imminent, even if ‘World War Three’ did not break out.69 The clear implication
was that skipping a first-stage bourgeois revolution, and revolting when local con-
ditions were constrained, might still work because of its place in, and possible impact
on, the overall international context. In a sense, the MCP was making the same sort of
calculation that Lenin had suggested in his 1916 work Imperialism: that enough
67 TNA: CO537=4246, Third Conference under the Chairmanship of His Excellency the
Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South East Asia, held at Bukit Serene, 16 May
1948. This listed 10 points of evidence behind the committee’s formation including ‘The growing
strength of Communist dominated world organisation such as the World Federation of Democratic
Youth’, communist successes in China, a new Russian legation in Bangkok, Czech events.
68 Ibid. Some measures, such as removing communists from sensitive posts (something announced for
the UK in March 1948) were merely following more general, emerging, ‘Cold War’ practices.
69 RHL MSS PIJ 12=1948, 30.6.1948, Appendix A, p. 2, information based on intelligence. This stated
that the campaign was ‘probably inspired from outside (MSS reports tended to waver on this), but that
reasons given locally included: (i) No political progress over three years; (ii) Members losing revolution-
ary spirit and needed to act immediately or fail; (iii) British economic problems with Malaya, its last
dollar-earning asset. Malaya could help wreck this money-earner, bring Britain to its knees, and prevent
it entering any third world war; (iv) The British Labour government being weak; and, possibility of help
via pressure from communist parties of other governments.
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sparks would bring down the superstructure, and so make local socialist revolution
possible in fairly unlikely places: such as Russia and Malaya.
In terms of the international line, we therefore need now to construct more
sophisticated chronologies and understandings of the web-like interconnections
between events. We need to better understand how international communist connec-
tions and lines worked, and how they interacted with local interpretations of the
developing international context. I suggest, at least for the sake of argument, that
the revisionist approach previously favoured sometimes bordered on being naïve
about the nature of communism, and at its worst set up largely irrelevant straw
men to knock down (such as specific communist directives for armed insurrection
passed through Calcutta). We have long known that that model is simplistic, so it
is time to stop holding it up as the target. Interestingly, in a world of al-Qaeda and
networked terrorist groups, an approach emphasising international lines, multiple,
overlapping loose networks, and local reception, all meshing together, seems more
relevant than ever. In short, the international aspect mattered, and matters.
2. The second area where a ‘post-revisionist’ or neo-orthodox approach can
change our interpretations is on the MCP’s precise roles, plans and responsibility
for events in 1948. Again, we replace the artificial ‘revisionist’ question (was there
an MCP plan to launch armed revolt in mid-1948) with more useful ones: Did the
MCP have a plan or programme of action intended to culminate in insurrection in
1948 itself? What was the impact of such MCP plans as there were?
One answer is that the MCP did develop a plan of action, though not a map of
the precise means to carry it out, for staged preparations for revolt. The March 1948
decisions, citing the changed international line, pointed to the use of violence and
murder in support of building up control of the masses, especially in labour relations.
It was a plan to shape the objective conditions on the ground so they would come to
favour a revolt, with the latter seen now as inevitable. This part of the plan was exe-
cuted from April, with mixed success and with the result that the British increased
union legislation, banishments and arrests. The May 1948 CC meeting therefore
anticipated a gradual move towards fully armed revolt, with the earliest date being
September. It is true that the MCP did not have a full strategy for the
post-armed-revolt stage in place, as they intended to call another meeting in July
or August. But they did have a plan for a staged preparation for that revolt, with
armed violence seen as an inevitable outcome.
Though in part motivated by a feeling that the British had closed down most
alternatives (the inauguration of the Federation on 1 February being a milestone),
the MCP’s tactics were far from merely ‘defensive’. To call them that is an insult to
the many labour contractors, employers, and others intimidated, and in some cases
murdered. Shooting these people – who were overwhelmingly not government
employees – throwing grenades and committing arson were not merely defensive
acts. They were intended to create fear, remove opposition, provoke government
reaction, and so prepare the ground for armed rebellion proper. To claim the MCP
did not have a plan for revolt, simply because it did not have a plan for the stage
of full-scale revolt in June – the date the British declared an Emergency – is wrong.
That the British could not find hard evidence of communist directives for armed
revolt by mid-June, and therefore of MCP plans to execute such revolt, has been a red
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herring. That Chin Peng has happily endorsed this revisionist line, while adding his
own gloss that the MCP’s motives and actions were mainly defensive, may partly
reflect his views at the time.70 But serious questions remain about why he does not
address the language in which the March 1948 decisions were couched – that of
the two camps – why he blames Sharkey for the kongchak tactics, when similar but
less violent tactics had been practised previously, and how he explains the MCP chan-
ging its mind over the unsuitability of conditions in Malaya for revolt, without coming
up with any analysis that suggested concrete changes on the ground. It is difficult to
escape the conclusion that his memory, though apparently sharp when he gave inter-
views and drafted his memoirs in the 1990s, was either self-consciously selective, or
suffered from convenient amnesia.
It seems, therefore, that from the British and MCP perspectives, the Cold War
did mature in Malaya in early 1948. From the Soviet perspective, and even Chinese
perspective, this was significant in that it had the potential to weaken imperialist
powers, even though both these powers and the United States declined to become
more than very marginally involved themselves. This was not so much a proxy
war, as a Cold War with great powers in absentia. As Geoff Wade discusses in this
issue, whether you date the beginnings of the Cold War in Malaya, and Southeast
Asia generally to 1948, depends on how you define ‘Cold War’. If that requires direct
great power engagement this was not yet ‘Cold War’ in its full sense. On the other
hand, both Britain and the MCP were thinking in terms analogous to ‘Cold War’
by 1948, and this context shaped their actions, and so the commencement of repres-
sion and revolt in June 1948. In the case of other areas, such as Indochina and Korea,
it could even be claimed that local actors dragged great power Cold War actors into
their arenas for their own purposes, rather than being victims of external
manipulation.
70 RHL MSS PIJ 12=1948, 30.6.1948, Appendix A, p. 3 describes Chin Peng as ‘one of the few moder-
ates remaining on the CEC’.
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